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In Defense of Federalism: The Need for a
Federal Institutional Defender of State

Interests

INTRODUCTION

he Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States have been interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court to provide protection against arbitrary
action by the federal and state governments, respectively.' When the high
Court perceives such action by the president, Congress, or state
governments, it strikes down that action as unconstitutional exercising its
implied power of judicial review. 2 But which branch of the federal
government responds when the arbitrary state action is the product of the
federal judiciary? Arizona state officials 3have need to ask this question
after the recent decision in Ring v. Arizona.
The U.S. Supreme Court exerts a pervasive influence in the area of
state criminal procedure, especially capital punishment.4 The Court's
decisions concerning capital punishment over the last three decades have
forced the states either to abandon capital punishment altogether or to
formulate procedures and policies that conform to the dictates of those
decisions. 5 The State of Arizona elected the latter course and developed a
procedure that met the demands of the Supreme Court.6 This procedure
required the trial judge to conduct a separate sentencing hearing following
a murder conviction to evaluate statutorily enumerated aggravating and
mitigating factors. The procedure made a death sentence unavailable

I.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934). "[Tlhe function of courts in
the application of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is to determine in each case
whether circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion of
governmental authority or condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory." Id.
2.
id.; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
3. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 657 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring),
4.
overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
5. Id. "Over the course of the past 15 years, this Court has assumed the role of
ld.
I..."
rulemaking body for the State's administration of capital sentencing .
concurring). "What compelled Arizona (and
6.
Ring, 536 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J.,
many other States) to specify particular "aggravating factors" that must be found before the
death penalty can be imposed was the line of this Court's cases beginning with Furman v.
Georgia." Id. (citations omitted).
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unless the judge found at least one aggravating factor. The Supreme Court
upheld Arizona's capital punishment procedure against a direct
constitutional challenge
under the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury in
8
Walton v. Arizona.
Nine years after the Walton decision, the Court reviewed a federal
carjacking statute in Jones v. United States.9 This statute authorized
escalating maximum sentences for carjackings involving serious bodily
injury or death.' 0 The question presented in Jones was whether the statute
should be interpreted to allow judges to find the factors necessary to trigger
the increased penalties. 1 The Court answered that question in the
negative.12 The majority believed prior case law suggested that the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury guarantee
clauses of the Sixth Amendment demanded that "any fact (other than prior
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt."' 3 In order to avoid a possible conflict with these
constitutional provisions, the majority interpreted the carjacking statute to
require that each element that increased the maximum penalty be submitted
to a jury. 14 The Jones Court specifically distinguished Walton from the
then-immediate case by reasoning that Arizona's capital punishment
procedure did not authorize an increased maximum penalty for murder
since Arizona law declared that maximum penalty to be death. 5 Under the

7. Id. at 592-93. The enumeration of mitigating factors was not meant to be
exclusive. Id. at 592 n.2. The burden of showing mitigating factors by a prepoihderance of
the evidence rested with the defendant. Walton, 497 U.S. at 649.
8. 497 U.S. at 649. "Any argument that the Constitution requires that a jury
impose the sentence of death or make the findings prerequisite to imposition of such a
sentence has been soundly rejected by prior decisions of this Court." Id. at 647 (quoting
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745 (1990)).
9.
526 U.S. 227 (1999).
10.
Id. at 229-30.
II.
Id.
12.
Id. at 251-52.
13.
Id. at 243 n.6.
14.
Id. at 251-52.
15. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251 (1999).
The Court [in Walton] characterized the finding of aggravating facts
falling within the traditional scope of capital sentencing as a choice
between a greater and a lesser penalty, not as a process of raising the
ceiling of the sentencing range available. We are frank to say that we
emphasize this careful reading of Walton's rationale ....
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Jones rationale, the Arizona sentencing hearing
6 determined only if the
maximum available sentence should be applied.1
A year after Jones, the Court considered New Jersey's hate crime
sentencing enhancement statute in Apprendi v. New Jersey.'7 New Jersey
law authorized an increase in the maximum penalty for a criminal offense
if a judge determined by a preponderance of the evidence at a sentencing
hearing that the offense was motivated by a purpose to intimidate persons
based on their race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or
ethnicity.' 8
The Court struck down the New Jersey sentencing
enhancement by elevating its opinion in Jones, that any factor increasing
the maximum penalty for a crime must be submitted to a jury, to the status
of constitutional law. 19 However, the Court again reaffirmed the continued
constitutional vitality of Walton.2 °
Two years after this second reaffirmation of Walton's continued
constitutional legitimacy, the U.S. Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona
reversed Walton and held Arizona's capital punishment procedure in
violation of the Sixth Amendment in light of its decisions in Jones and
Apprendi - the same decisions that contained explicit assurances of
Walton's viability. 2' Such a dramatic reversal, which will again force the
State of Arizona either to reconstruct its capital punishment system or
abandon capital punishment altogether, smacks of the arbitrariness that
both of the Due Process Clauses forbid.2 2
The question, now particularized, is again presented: what recourse
does the State of Arizona have against actions by the Supreme Court that
Arizona perceives as unconstitutional? The brief answer, aside from
rebellion or refusal to abide by the high Court's decision, is none.23 This

16.
Jones, 526 U.S. at 251.
17.
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
18.
Id. at 468-69.
19.
Id. at 490.
20.
Id. at 496. "[T]his Court has previously considered and rejected the argument
that the principles guiding our decision today render invalid state capital sentencing schemes
requiring judges, after a jury verdict holding a defendant guilty of a capital crime, to find
specific aggravating factors before imposing a sentence of death." Id.
21.
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 600-03, 609 (2002). The majority in Ring relied
on the dissenting opinions in Jones and Apprendi to undermine the authority of the
arguments made by the majorities in those opinions to reaffirm the legitimacy of Walton.
Id. at 600-03.
22.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934).
23.
Although the Constitution provides the states with the ability to compel
Congress to call a convention to consider constitutional amendments, it is "a cumbersome
and unreliable strategy which has never been successfully accomplished." Todd J. Zywicki,

Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the Seventeenth Amendment and its
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comment explores this conundrum and offers two specific remedies for the
reader's consideration: (1) the repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment and
(2) a constitutional amendment providing a congressional override of
federal judicial decisions. A brief review of the theory and structure of
American government will help demonstrate that these proposals are
consistent with the form and tenor of the Constitution.
I. CURRENT STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Judicial interpretation of the Due Process Clause is not the primary
constitutional protection against arbitrary or other improper governmental
action.24 Judicial review is but one mechanism built into the structure of
the American political order to keep the whole of the national government,
and each of its branches, within its constitutionally prescribed role. 25 The
president and Congress control other mechanisms to assert their interests
and defend themselves and the public against improper conduct by another
branch.26 Through the intricate system of separation of powers, all of the
branches of the federal government are placed in an arena of perpetual
political competition where each branch can attempt to define for itself the
scope of its authority and, simultaneously, resist the excesses and the
encroachments of the other branches.27 However, in the light of the
problem presented above, this arrangement is flawed for two reasons: (1)
Implicationsfor Current Reform Proposals,45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165, 213 (1997).
24.

See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison).

26.

THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison), No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton).

25.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 505 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library College
Editions 1964). The Supreme Court has a duty "to declare all acts contrary to the manifest
tenor of the Constitution void." Id. However, Justice Jackson recognized that judicial
determination of the limits of the various branches of government is insufficient in itself to
preserve the boundaries between the three branches of government. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). "[T]here was
worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that 'The tools belong to the man who
can use them.' [The Court] may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the
hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its
fingers." Id.
27.
THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (James Madison), No. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or
James Madison). "[N]o skill in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate
and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces - the legislative, executive,
and judiciary; or even the privileges and powers of the different legislative branches." THE
FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Modern Library College Editions, 1964).
The only way to define the boundaries of the three branches of the federal government and
thereby keep each branch in its proper role is "by so contriving the interior structure of the
government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means
of keeping each other in their proper places." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 336 (Alexander
Hamilton or James Madison) (Modern Library College Editions 1964).
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the lack of a federal defender of state interests deprives the states of any
benefit from the existing separation of powers scheme and (2) even if the
states had such a defender, the Constitution provides inadequate
mechanisms for that defender to challenge the improper exercise of judicial
review.
Improper government action is a product of what The Federalist
called faction-an ever present, unavoidable threat to popular
government.2 8 A faction is "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other29
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.,,
Publius 30 identified the most enduring source of faction as the unequal
distribution of property (i.e., the tension between the rich and poor) and
believed this faction to be the most destructive to a democratic society.3'
Faction is most potent in a small republic where the number of interests in
the community is correspondingly small, thus making the rich/poor faction
more likely to dominate the public debate.3 2 Publius reasoned that the
initial solution to this problem of government is to expand the sphere of
governance to include as many different kinds of interests as possible, so
that no one faction can claim the support of the majority of the citizenry.3 3

28.

THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).

29.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 54 (James Madison) (Modem Library College
Editions 1964).
30.
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison wrote The Federalistunder
the pseudonym of Publius. MARTIN DIAMOND, As FAR AS REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES WILL
ADMIT 38 (William A. Schambra ed., 1992) [hereinafter REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES].

31.

THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 29, at 56; MARTIN DIAMOND, THE

32.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, supra note 31, at 72.

FOUNDING OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 72 (1981)

[hereinafter DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC].

The division over amount of

wealth "leads to the class struggles that destroyed so many older democracies - the mortal
combat of the few rich against the many poor." Id.
33.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties
and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests,
the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the
smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller
the compass within which they are placed, the more easily they will
concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and
you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less
probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to
invade the rights of other citizens ....

THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 29, at 60-61.
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In the absence of a majority faction,
ordinary majority rule controls the
34
destructive effects of this vice.
Expanding the sphere of governance is only the first defense against
the danger of faction. The second defense is the separation of powers. 35 In
a democratic society, the institutions of government are presumably
responsive to the will of the people.36 As the people are likely to often be
moved by the passions of the moment (and as some of those passions are
occasionally contrary to the rights of others), those institutions must be
capable of resisting the temptation to serve the majority passion of the
moment.37 The founders insulated the federal government from the whims
of public opinion by differing as much as possible the times and methods of
election for each branch of that government,38 so as to create separate and
distinct departments capable of resisting a branch that may succumb to a
faction for a time. 39 Each branch of government possesses its own unique
ambitions and interests and is equipped to exercise its powers and to defend
itself against the usurpations of the other branches.4 0 Thus, faction is kept
in check first by incorporating as many interests into the body politic as
possible to prevent a majority faction, and second by requiring any faction
to control the three different branches of government simultaneously and
for a long duration to effectuate its goals.4 '

34.
35.

36.

Id. at 57.

THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison).
See Paul E. McGreal, Ambition's Playground, 68 FORDHAM L.

REV. 1107,
1141-42 (2000).
37.
THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 410 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison)

(Modem Library College Editions 1964).
[T]here are particular moments in pubic affairs when the people,
stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or
misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for
measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to
lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be
the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in
order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow mediated
by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can
regain their authority over the public mind?
Id.
38.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. I; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, amended by U.S. CONST.

amend. XVII; U.S. CONST. art. It, § I, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII; U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.

39.
40.

McGreal, supra note 36, at 1136.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison).

41.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), No. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or
James Madison).
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Publius placed Congress at the cornerstone of his separation of powers
scheme.42 He believed the nature of the legislative branch to be at once the
most powerful of the three departments of government and the most
susceptible to the vice of faction.43 The legislature is prone to predominate
because its constitutional powers are more extensive and less subject to
precise limitations than the powers granted to the executive and the
judiciary. 44 Further, the legislative control over the purse strings of
government gives the legislature great leverage over the other two
branches.45 Therefore, the first defense built into the separation of powers
structure is the division of the national legislature into two separate
branches-the House of Representatives and the Senate-with different
modes of election.4 6
Before Congress can act, a majority of the
representatives
of
two
distinct
constituencies must concur in the proposed
47
act.

The presidential veto and judicial review constitute the other major
protections built into the structure of American government to guard
against legislative misbehavior. 48
The president, answerable to a

42.

See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison).

43.
THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 322-23 (James Madison) (Modem Library College
Editions 1964). Alexis de Tocqueville articulated the identical view nearly a half-century
later. I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 254 (Phillips Bradley trans.,
Everyman's Library 1994) (1835) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY I]. "The very essence of
democratic government consists in the absolute sovereignty of the majority . . . Of all
political institutions, the legislature is the one that is most easily swayed by the will of the
majority." Id.
44.
THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 43, at 323.
45. Id.
46.
THE FEDERALIST No. 5 1, supra note 27, at 338; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. I;
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily
predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the
legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different
modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected
with each other as the nature of their common functions and their
common dependence on the society will admit.
THE FEDERALIST No. 5 1, supra note 27, at 338.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison)
47.
(Modern Library College Editions 1964). Under the original Constitution, Congress could
pass no law without "the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a
majority of the States." Id. However, with the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment,
the mode of senatorial election changed from state legislature appointment to popular
election, thus changing the constituency of the Senate to be more like that of the House of
Representatives. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, §
I.
48.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library
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constituency distinct from that represented by either house of Congress, is
given the limited authority to either prevent any legislative act from
becoming law or to refuse to execute those laws that he may find
constitutionally offensive. 49 Finally, the judiciary (not having a direct
constituency and only subject to the checks and balances exercised by the
president or Congress) 50 is allowed the discretion to refuse to administer
duly enacted laws if that branch finds those laws to be inconsistent with the
Constitution. 5 1 Under this scheme, the cooperation of all three branches of
government is required before any enduring direct federal action may be
accomplished.52
The purpose of the separation of powers scheme extends beyond
controlling the excesses of the legislature. The checks and balances
afforded by this system also provide Congress, the president, and the
federal courts with the authority to perform their constitutionally
designated responsibilities and permits each branch the ambition and the
means to counter the encroachments of the other branches.53 If Congress
determines that the president or the judiciary is assuming or undermining
its legislative powers; 54 if the president senses that Congress or the
judiciary is interfering with his duties of faithfully executing the laws, of
serving as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, or of conducting
foreign affairs; 55 or if the judiciary believes that the president or Congress

College Editions 1964); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 25, at 505.
49.
THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 48, at 477; See McGreal, supra note 36, at
1118, 1142. Publius stated that the presidential veto
not only serves as a shield to the Executive, but it furnishes an
additional security against the enaction of improper laws. It establishes
a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the
community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse
unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority
of that body.
THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 48, at 476-77. The president's constituency consists of
the entire American people. McGreal, supra note 36, at 1142; see THE FEDERALIST No. 68,
at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library College Editions 1964).
50.
McGreal, supra note 36, at 1143.
51.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 25, at 506. "[W]here the will of the
legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the
Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former." Id.
52.
McGreal, supra note 36, at 1119.
53.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 27, at 337. "[Tlhe great security against a
gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to
those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal
motives to resist encroachments of the others." Id.
54.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
55.
U.S. CONST. art. II.
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is threatening its authority to decide cases or controversies, 56 each of these
federal branches is armed with the tools to resist such actions.
Herein lies Arizona's first problem with this system. The vast
majority of criminal prosecutions in the United States occur under state
law,57 making the effective and efficient administration of criminal justice
of paramount interest to the states.58 However, the State of Arizona is
defenseless to protect this interest from arbitrary interference by the federal
judiciary because it is neither a participant in the separation of powers
The
system nor a constituent of any of the existing participants.5 9
constituents of the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate are the
citizens of the states, not the governments of the states. 60 The president's
constituency consists of the American people, not the governments of the
states. 6' Finally, the federal judiciary has no direct constituency to whom it
answers. 62 None of these federal officials owe their position to the states,
and therefore none of the branches of the federal government have a vested
interest in defending the states against improper actions by a federal
branch.63 Therefore, any state finding itself on the receiving end of
arbitrary federal action meddling in its interests has no direct recourse in
the structural protections currently provided by the Constitution.
II. REPEAL OF THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT

The states need to be a constituent of one of the branches of the
federal government if the Constitution is to protect their interests through

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
57.
In 1998, 99.6% of all criminal prosecutions in the United States were
prosecuted under state law. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 551 (2000)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
58.
See id. In 1998, a total of 14,681,021 criminal cases were filed in state and
federal courts throughout the United States. See id. Only 57,691 of these cases were federal
criminal filings. See id. Assuming that each of the fifty states filed the same number of
criminal cases in 1998, each state had an approximate criminal caseload in that year of
292,466 cases, over five times the case load of the federal criminal courts. See id. From
these numbers, it would appear that the states have a higher interest in criminal justice than
does any branch of the federal government, including the judiciary.
See McGreal, supra note 36, at 1141-43.
59.
60.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. I; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. I, amended by U.S.
CONST. amend. XVII, § I.
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 68, supra note 49, at 443. "[Tlhe Executive should be
independent for his continuance in the office on all but the people themselves." Id.
62.
McGreal, supra note 36, at 1143.
63.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison).

56.
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the existing separation of powers structure. 64 The selection of the branch

best able to represent the states as political entities is greatly simplified by
the fact that the U.S. Senate served in that capacity for 122 years before the
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment. 65 That amendment, ratified in
1913, significantly altered the structure of American government by
requiring all U.S. senators to be popularly elected rather than selected by
the legislatures of the several states. 66 By ratifying the Seventeenth
Amendment, the states relinquished their representation in the U.S. Senate
and left themselves vulnerable to abuses by the federal government. 67 The
fact of the Senate's prior form makes that body the obvious and best choice
for a federal institutional defender of state interests.
The founders designed the Senate for two purposes: (1) to divide
Congress into two houses to weaken its predominance over the executive
and the judiciary68 and (2) to provide the states with a measure of selfdefense against the federal government. 69 A change in the Senate's mode

64.
See McGreal, supra note 36, at 1141-43.
65.
See Ralph A. Rossum, The Irony of ConstitutionalDemocracy: Federalism, the
Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 671, 704-05
(1999).
66.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. It is
important to note that the Seventeenth Amendment did not create the popular election of
U.S. senators as most states at the time of the ratification of this amendment had already
incorporated "'democratic elements to their system for electing Senators." Zywicki, supra
note 23, at 194.
67.
Rossum, supra note 65, at 714-15. "Since 1913, there has been a profound
increase in the number and intrusiveness of congressional measures invading the 'residuary
sovereignty' of the states." Id. at 715.
68.
It should be noted that The Federalistarticulated the Senate's ultimate purpose
as being a source of stability for the national government. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 62, 63
(Alexander Hamilton or James Madison). This purpose is an important aspect of weakening
the dominance of the legislature since Publius expected the House of Representatives to be
easily and continuously swayed by the factions of American society. Id. The Senate could
be described as a quasi-antimajoritarian branch of government. Zywicki, supra note 23, at
182; THE FEDERALIST No. 63, supra note 37, at 410.
69.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 27, at 338; THE FEDERALIST No. 62, supra

note

47, at 402;

JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 211

1787

(Ohio University Press 1966) (1840) [hereinafter

Dr. Johnson of Connecticut took the floor of the Convention on June 29, 1787,
and articulated what is now considered to be the basis of the Connecticut Compromise
between those advocating and those opposing the election of Senators by the state
legislatures:
The fact is that the States do exist as political Societies, and a
[Government] is to be formed for them in their political capacity, as
well as for the individuals composing them. Does it not seem to follow,
that if the States as such are to exist they must be armed with some
DEBATES].

power of self-defence [sic] ....

[A]s in some respects the States are to
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of election to again make that body sympathetic to state interests will
require only a minimal constitutional modification since a restoration of the
Senate to its original form is all that is required. 70 The repeal of the
Seventeenth Amendment would give the states access to the Senate's
existing checks and balances against all the federal government branches,
thus requiring no additional constitutional amendments to secure the states
from federal interference. 7' A repeal would have the additional benefit of
fortifying the distinction between the House of Representatives and the
Senate.72 The change in senatorial election made the Senate's constituency
very similar to that of the House of Representatives, thus reducing the
protection that the division of the legislature provided against faction.73
The history of the Seventeenth Amendment provides further support
for its repeal. The first call for changing the method of electing U.S.
senators came in 1826. 74 Efforts to pass a constitutional amendment for
this end were made periodically throughout the mid-nineteenth century.75
The calls for direct election of senators increased dramatically in the 1870s
and eventually evolved into a nationwide movement that culminated in the
Seventeenth Amendment. 76 Despite the broad-based support for the
amendment, scholars have been able to piece together only a few
grievances that were supposed to be redressed by a change in senatorial
election.77 Among these were corruption and bribery in the senate election
process, 78 state legislative deadlock on senatorial elections, 79 and the
growth of a "deep-seated suspicion of wealth and influence., 80 Although

be considered in their political capacity, and in others as districts of
individual citizens, the two ideas embraced on different sides, instead of
being opposed to each other, ought to be combined; that in one branch
[of Congress] the people, ought to be represented; in the other the
States.
MADISON, supra (emphasis in original).
70.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. A
constitutional amendment repealing the Seventeenth Amendment would nullify that
provision, thus restoring Article I to its original form. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII,
repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
71.
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 7, 8.
72.
See Zywicki, supra note 23, at 214-215.
73.
Id.
74.
Rossum, supra note 65, at 705.
75.
See Zywicki, supra note 23, at 183; Rossum, supra note 65, at 705.
Zywicki, supra note 23, at 183.
76.
77.
See, e.g., Rossum, supra note 65, at 706-08; Zywicki, supra note 23, at 195201.
78.
Zywicki, supra note 23, at 196.
79.
Id. at 198.
80.
Rossum, supra note 65, at 708.
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the Seventeenth Amendment addressed the second of these issues, history
continues to demonstrate that popular election of public officials neither
prevents bribery and corruption nor does it abate public suspicion of wealth
and influence in American government. 8'
There is also compelling
evidence suggesting that the complaints about legislative deadlocking were
exaggerated. 8 Most importantly, the Seventeenth Amendment's impact on
federalism received scant attention during the congressional debates of the
amendment.83 As this amendment made a vital change in the structure of
American government, and as no legitimate justification for the severity of
that change was put forward, this amendment was an ill-considered
measure in an era rich in constitutional modification. 84
The restoration of the power of the state legislatures to elect senators
would again provide the states with a measure of influence in the
functioning of the federal government, but would not transform the Senate
into the servant of the state governments.8 5 During the Constitutional
Convention, James Madison and other founders shared a deep concern that
the national government they were forming would be undermined by the
power of the states. 86 Congress called the Constitutional Convention
because the national government formed under Articles of Confederation

81.
Zywicki, supra note 23, at 186. "There is widespread recognition in the
literature that one important effect of the Seventeenth Amendment has been to increase the
role of political organization and money in the election of Senators." Id. Senator Robert
Torricelli's resignation during the 2002 New Jersey Senate campaign provides further
evidence of the persistence of corruption in politics despite the popular election of Senators.
See Evan Osnos & Jeff Zeleny, Embattled Torricelli Quits N.J. Senate Bid; Ethics Scandal
Puts Democrats in Bind, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 2002, § 1, at I.
82.
Zywicki, supra note 23, at 198-201. Professor Zywicki maintains that the
number of states that deadlocked in the election of a Senator was small compared to the
number of successful elections. Id. Perhaps more importantly, many of the states that
experienced legislative deadlock were newly-admitted western states that were still
developing their political institutions. Id. As these state legislatures learned from their
mistakes, the number of deadlocks during Senate elections decreased. Id.
83.
Rossum, supra note 65, at 711-12. "What is particularly noteworthy of the
lengthy debate over the adoption and ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment is the
absence of any serious or systematic consideration of its potential impact on federalism....
Almost no one (not even among the opposition) paused to weigh the consequences of the
Amendment on federalism." Id.
84.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (ratified Feb. 3, 1913); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII
(ratified Apr. 8, 1913); U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (ratified Jan. 16, 1919, repealed 1933);
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (ratified Aug. 18, 1920).
85.
See McGreal, supra note 36, at 1142.
86.
DEBATES, supra note 69, at 30. In presenting the Virginia Plan to the
Convention, Edmund Randolph enumerated the defects of the Articles of Confederation. Id.
at 29. Among the defects Mr. Randolph listed was "that the federal government could not
defend itself against the incroachments [sic] from the states." Id. at 30.
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lacked the power to govern the Union effectively. 87 Madison sought to
assure that the new government under the Constitution would not be
subservient to the states. 88 The Virginia Delegation, of which Madison was
a member, presented to the Convention a blueprint for the new Constitution
that called for a divided national legislature, but did not provide for equal
state representation in the Senate or for state election of senators.89
Although Madison ultimately lost the fight on both of these counts, he did
succeed in limiting state influence in the Senate as much as possible by
winning non-violable six-year terms and per-capita voting in the Senate. 90
The non-violable six-year Senate term would be a formidable
protection against states using the Senate simply to impair the functioning

87.
The Call for the Federal Constitutional Convention (Feb. 21, 1787), in THE
FEDERALIST 557 (Modern Library College Editions 1964). Hamilton's great dissatisfaction
with the Confederacy is captured by the following excerpt:
The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing
Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or
GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE
CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of
which they consist ....

[T]he United States has an indefinite discretion

to make requisitions for men and money; but they have no authority to
raise either, by regulations extending to individual citizens of America.
The consequence of this is, that though in theory their resolutions
concerning those objects are laws, constitutionally binding on the
members of the Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations
which the States observe or disregard at their option.
THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 89-90 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library College Editions
1964) (emphasis in original).
88.
DEBATES, supra note 69, at 293-95.
[Mr.] Madison expressed his apprehensions that if the proper foundation
of [Government] was destroyed, by substituting an equality in place of a
proportional Representation [in the Senate], no proper superstructure
would be raised ....

He reminded [the delegates] of the consequences

of laying the existing confederation on improper principles. All the
principal parties to its compilation, joined immediately in mutilating &
fettering the [Government] in such a manner that it has disappointed
every hope placed on it.
Id. at 293.
89.
Id. at 31. The fifth resolution of the Virginia Plan read in part:
[Resolved] that the members of the second branch of the National
Legislature ought to be elected by those of the first, out of a proper
number of persons nominated by the individual Legislatures, to be the
age of

[-]

years at least; to hold their offices for a term sufficient to

ensure their independency ....
Id. at 31. Note that under this plan the state legislatures were to nominate candidates, but
the House of Representatives would actually elect the members of the Senate. Id.
90.
See REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES, supra note 30, at 152; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cI.
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of the federal government. 9' The long term gives senators independence
from their electors, allowing them the opportunity to develop a national
perspective and a license to occasionally disagree with their electors.92
Further, during the course of a particular senator's term, intervening
general elections would likely affect the composition of the state
legislature. 93 The legislature that would decide whether to re-elect a
particular senator would have the possibility of being different than the one
that originally elected him. 94 Thus, a senator. would be more likely to
remain true to the state's best and general interests rather than to pursue the
extreme agenda of a particular legislature.95
The per-capita voting in the Senate also makes it less likely that the
Senate would become simply an extension of the states.96 Each state has
two senators and each of those senators may cast their votes independently
of the other.97 This ability gives each Senator the opportunity to form
independent legislative judgments.98 If a state's delegation splits for any
reason, that state's voice in the Senate is effectively neutralized. 99
Therefore, a state's delegation could be brought to bear in the Senate only
if its two senators, insulated by long terms and likely elected by different
legislative sessions,1 ° decide that a particular action is in the best interest
of their state and their nation. 101

91.
See McGreal, supra note 36, at 1142.
92.
REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES, supra note 30, at 174-75.
93.
See Az. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 21. Under the Constitution of the State of
Arizona, all state legislators serve two-year terms and are subject to a term limitation of four
consecutive terms. Id. Therefore, in the course of an Arizona U.S. Senator's six-year term,
the whole state legislature will experience three election cycles with the possibility of
certain members being forced from their seats by term limits. Id.
94.
See id.
95.
See McGreal, supra note 36, at 1142.
96.

REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES, supra note 30, at 174-75.

97.
Id. Under the Articles of Confederation, each state was permitted between two
and seven representatives in Congress but allowed only one vote.
ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION, art. V, c]. 2, 4. The Articles also permitted a state to recall their
representatives at will, a luxury denied the states under the Constitution. ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION, art. V, cl. I; REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES, supra note 30, at 175.

98.
REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES, supra note 30, at 174-75.
99.
See id.
100.
The Constitution divides the membership of the U.S. Senate into three nearly
equal classes so that only approximately one-third of the Senate is subject to re-election at
any one time. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2. In complying with this constitutional mandate,
the Senate not only divided its membership into thirds, but also divided each state's
senatorial delegation into different classes. See U.S. Senate Across the Nation, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 7, 2002, § 2, at 17 (showing that in 2002 no one state elected both of its U.S. senators).
This arrangement denies the states the ability to select both their senators simultaneously,
thus providing another protection against the states hijacking the U.S. Senate should the
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Finally, most Senate action must also meet with the approval of the
02
House of Representatives and the president before it can have any effect.1
Should the Senate succumb to some faction emanating from the state
legislatures, such a faction would be checked by the House of
Representatives, the president, and the Supreme Court.'0 3 Thus, any
concern about the impact of repealing the Seventeenth Amendment is
unfounded.
The repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment will not in itself provide
the State of Arizona with a remedy against the arbitrary judicial action
taken in Ring v. Arizona. Arizona has another serious problem with the
existing separation of powers system. Even if the Senate acted as the
states' advocate in that system, the current tools available to Congress to
resist improper conduct by the federal judiciary are insufficient to protect
against judicial overreaching on the federal level, let alone protecting the
states.' °4 Therefore, an effective remedy for Arizona and all the states of
this Union that is consistent with the theory of separation of powers will
require that Congress be given the additional necessary tool to resist
improper action by the federal
judiciary, namely, a congressional override
05
of federal court decisions.1
III. TWO-THIRDS CONGRESSIONAL OVERRIDE OF FEDERAL COURT
DECISIONS

The restoration of the U.S. Senate as the federal institutional defender
of state interests is insufficient to provide the states with the requisite
protection they need against the pervasive influence of the federal
judiciary.'16 Although the states would again have access to the checks and
balances of the separation of powers system, the founders designed that
system with primarily the legislative and executive powers in mind. 0 7

Seventeenth Amendment be repealed. See McGreal, supra note 36, at 1141-42.
101.
102.
103.

See REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES, supra note 30, at 174-75.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison).

104.
See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM
AND AMERICAN DECLINE 115-17 (1996).

105.
106.

107.

See id.
See id.

DEBATES, supra note 69, at 312, 326-27.
If it be a fundamental principle of free [Government] that the
Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers should be separately

exercised, it is equally so that they be independently exercised. There is
the same & perhaps greater reason why the Executive [should] be
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They paid relatively little attention to the shape and scope of the judiciary
during the Constitutional Convention and left the vast bulk of the creation
of the judicial department to the first Congress. 0 8 As a result, most of the
tools made available to Congress to counter the designs of the judiciary are
blunt weapons fit to address only the most egregious violations of
constitutional principles.'°9 If the states are to have a means of real selfdefense against the federal judiciary through the Senate, then the Senate
must have a means of proportionally challenging specific constitutional
decisions rendered by the courts." 0
Congress' existing checks and balances against the judiciary do not
provide that body with the means to address its grievances against the
courts with proportionate particularity.'
At present, Congress has eight
methods of expressing its displeasure with constitutional jurisprudence: (1)
the Senate's participation in the appointment of all Article III judges;" 12 (2)
altering the number of Supreme Court justices and other judges;" 3 (3)
restricting the jurisdiction of the courts;" 4 (4) conditioning judicial funding
on favorable overturning of offending decisions;" 5 (5) impeaching and7
removing federal judges;" l6 (6) disestablishing the lower federal courts;"1
(7) ignoring judicial decisions;" 8 or (8) amending the Constitution with the
assistance of three-fourths of the states.' 9 In the context of Congress
showing its occasional dissatisfaction with judicial conduct, each of these
tools is either ineffectual
to redress a particular grievance or overly potent
20
for that purpose.

independent of the Legislature, than why the Judiciary should: A
coalition of the two former powers would be more immediately &
certainly dangerous to public liberty.
Id. at 326-27 (emphasis in original).
108.
Rossum, supra note 65, at 683.
109.
Steven D. Smith, Why Should Courts Obey the Law?, 77 GEO. L.J. 113, 156
(1988).
110.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
Ill. See Smith, supra note 109, at 155.
112.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
113.
Smith, supra note 109, at 155.
114.
Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S (7 Wall.) 506, 515 (1868).
115.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 43, at 323.
The Constitution prohibits Congress from adversely modifying judicial salaries. U.S.
CONST. art. lII, § I.
116.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
117.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
118.
See W. Lawrence Church, History and the Constitutional Role of Courts,
1990 Wis. L. REV. 1071, 1090 (1990).
119.

120.

U.S. CONST. art. V.

See Smith, supra note 109, at 155-56.
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Presuming that the states elected the Senate and that Arizona's
congressional delegation convinced Congress that the decision in Ring v.
Arizona amounted to an arbitrary exercise of judicial authority, Congress
would have insufficient means to challenge that specific abuse.' 2' None of
the above enumerated congressional powers, save the amendment power,
would have the effect of immediately changing the status of Ring as a
binding precedent on all lower federal and state courts, and exercise of
most of those powers would be counter-productive and even destructive to
American government. 22 The Senate's participation in the selection of
23
federal judges provides no present relief against improper judicial action.
Restricting the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to prevent the Court
from hearing future state criminal appeals also would not change Ring's
status as authoritative law. 24 The remedies involving the judicial budget,
impeachment, disestablishment of lower courts, and ignoring judicial
decisions are drastic measures that are evidently unfit to be employed by
Congress to address its periodic disagreements with the Court. Congress
requires a judiciary esteemed by the public and capable of administering its
laws. 25 Congress cannot cultivate public respect for its laws and the
branch administering them by directly undermining the judiciary's
institutional integrity. 26 Finally, the Constitution is a poor place for
Congress to catalog its specific disagreements with the federal judiciary.' 27
Thus, Congress is forced to choose between either acquiescing to improper
128
judicial action or forcefully attacking the judicial branch.

121.
See id.
122.
See BORK, supra note 104, at 114-17.
123.
Smith, supra note 109, at 155. The Senate's role in confirming judicial
nominees is not a sure method of shaping the judiciary since accurately predicting a jurist's
future conduct for a lifetime is impossible. Thomas E. Baker, Exercising the Amendment
Power to Disapprove of Supreme Court Decisions: A Proposal for a "Republican Veto," 22
HASTINGS CONST.

L.Q. 325, 329-30 (1995).

124.
See BORK, supra note 104, at 115-17.
125.
See DEBATES, supra note 69, at 340; THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 515
(Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library College Editions 1964). "[Tjhe judiciary authority
of the Union ought to extend to [all cases] which arise out of the laws of the United States,
passed in pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of legislation ......
THE
FEDERALIST No. 80, supra.

126.

See THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).

127.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 572-73 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem
Library College Editions 1964). Publius possessed "a thorough conviction that any
amendments which may, upon mature consideration, be thought useful, will be applicable to
the organization of the government, not to the mass of its powers .... " Id.
128.
See Smith, supra note 109, at 155-56.
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An analogy to the legislative-executive relationship clarifies the nature
of this condition. 29 The Constitution provides that a legislative enactment
will become law either upon being passed by a majority of each house of
Congress and signed by the president, or in the alternative, upon being
passed by a majority of both houses of Congress, vetoed by the president,
30
and subsequently passed again by a two-thirds majority of each house.
Suppose instead that the Constitution limited congressional reaction to a
presidential veto to accepting the veto, attempting to force the president's
submission by conditioning the executive's future funding on a change of
mind, or impeaching and removing the president. Or suppose that the
Constitution forced the president to either accept or veto legislative
enactments for an entire session of Congress en masse. The result of either
of these scenarios would be the same as that currently existing between
Congress and the Supreme Court - a choice between acquiescence or
severe attack.13' Instead, Article I provides a middle road where it is
ultimately up to Congress to either bolster its proposals with the support of
two-thirds of its membership in each house or to ratify the president's
determination of the enactment's improvidence. 132
The Constitution's failure to allow Congress the same latitude in
interacting with the judiciary may be the result of the founder's modest,
and even uncertain, expectations of the federal judiciary.' 33 In 1787, an
independent national judiciary was a novel governmental concept and the
founders may simply have lacked the practical experience to adequately
anticipate that institution's nature. 134 The founders' lack of experience with
the judiciary relative to their knowledge of legislative and executive power
may explain the placement, brevity, and generality of the constitutional

129.
See Baker, supra note 123, at 333-35.
130.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
131.
See Smith, supra note 109, at 155-56.
132.
THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 48, at 480. "A direct and categorical
negative has something in the appearance of it more harsh, and more apt to irritate, than the
mere suggestion of argumentative objections to be approved or disapproved by those to
whom they are addressed." Id.
133.
Rossum, supra note 65, at 683; Baker, supra note 123, at 328.
134.
See DEMOCRACY I, supra note 43, at 98. Writing in the 1830s, Tocqueville
commented:
I have seen republics elsewhere than upon the shores of the New World
alone: the representative system of government has been adopted in
several states of Europe; but I am not aware that any nation of the globe
has hitherto organized a judicial power in the same manner as the
Americans.
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provisions creating the federal courts. 35 Publius' equally brief and placed
treatment of the courts in The Federalistlends additional evidence to show
the founders' potential lack of experience with an independent judicial
power. 136 Perhaps more revealing is Publius' assertion that the judiciary
would be a passive governmental actor virtually incapable of encroaching
on the other branches.' 37 Whatever the reason for the founder's giving
reduced attention to the courts, The Federalist'sexpectation of a relatively
benign judiciary formed before the adoption of the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment. 38 It is these constitutional provisions that created
the fertile ground for the judiciary to grow 39beyond its anticipated status as
the least dangerous branch of government. 1
Publius opposed the adoption of a bill of rights to the federal
constitution for two specific reasons: (1) a bill of rights would provide the
federal government with a pretext to claim more powers than were
granted 40 and (2) the impossibility of giving an all-encompassing

135.
Rossum, supra note 65, at 683. The judiciary is the last of the three federal
powers established by the Constitution. Id. Article III is by far the most brief and general
of the three major articles of the Constitution. Id. Where Articles I and II provide detailed
provisions for the qualifications of congresspersons and the president, for the respective
powers those bodies are to exercise, and for the interaction between them, Article III
provides no judicial procedure, no guidelines for its interaction with the other branches, or
even qualifications for federal judges. Id. Under Article III, federal judges need not be
citizens of the United States. Id.
136.
See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78-83 (Alexander Hamilton). Only six papers at the
end of The Federalist are devoted to the judiciary branch (including No. 83, which is
devoted entirely to the topic of jury trials). Id. Six papers compared to fifteen devoted to
Congress (Nos. 52-66) and eleven to the president (Nos. 67-77) provides further insight into
Publius' level of concern for, and expertise in, the different branches of government.
137.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 25, at 504. Publius maintained that,
the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least
dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be
least in a capacity to annoy or injure them .... The judiciary ... has no
influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the
strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution
whatever.
Id. Publius further argued that the judiciary posed only an illusory threat to Congress since
the judiciary would be unlikely to challenge the branch with the authority to impeach and
remove them. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 526-27 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library
College Editions 1964). However, history has shown impeachment to be an overly potent
weapon for Congress to use in redressing its grievances against the judiciary. Smith, supra
note 109, at 155.
138.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 559 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library
College Editions 1964).
139.
See Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250
(1833); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-50 (1968).
140.
THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 138, at 559.
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definition to any particular right.' 4' At the time, Publius and the other
founders were primarily concerned with abuses by Congress, as is
evidenced by the first word in the First Amendment. 42 In the case of the
judiciary, the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment have provided
the federal courts with a very colorful pretext to declare themselves not
only the guardian of the rights guaranteed, but also to provide the very
definition of those rights. 43 As is evidenced in Ring v. Arizona, this
arrangement allows the federal judiciary to strike down state legislation as
unconstitutional with impunity, limited only by its own restraint.144 In
1990, Arizona's capital punishment procedure did not offend the right to a
fair trial guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 45 In 2002,
after the Supreme Court redefined that right in Jones and Apprendi, the
Court struck down that same procedure in its self-appointed role as the
supreme protector of civil liberties.'46 The Supreme Court's exercise of its
power of judicial review thus amounts to an unqualified veto over a wide
range of federal and state action since Congress has no practical means to
challenge specific exercises of that review. 147
The propriety of a qualification on judicial review may be established
on the The Federalist'srationale for the limited executive veto., 48 Publius

Id.

Id.

[B]ills of rights . . . are not only unnecessary in the proposed
Constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various
exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would
afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why
declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?
141.

Id. at 560.
What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which
would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be
impracticable; and from this I infer, that its security, whatever fine
declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must
altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the
people and of the government.

142.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law .. " Id.
143.
See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159.
144.
See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608.(2002). The Court can abandon the
doctrine of stare decisis whenever it determines that necessity and propriety require it. id.
In Ring, the Court limited its determination of necessity and propriety to asserting that the
Walton and Apprendi decisions were irreconcilable, notwithstanding the majority opinions
to the contrary in Jones and Apprendi. Id. at 600, 602, 608.
145.
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
146.
See Ring, 536 U.S. at 608-09.
147.
Baker, supra note 123, at 334-35.
148.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 48, at 477-80.
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argued that the Constitution provided the president with a limited veto
power over Congress for two reasons: (1) to provide the national executive
with a means of self-defense and (2) to give the executive the opportunity
to prevent the passing of bad laws by Congress "through haste,
inadvertence, or design."' 149 The founders bestowed the president with the
veto for this latter purpose not because they expected the president to
possess more wisdom and virtue than Congress, but because they expected
Congress to make mistakes. 50 The qualified veto provides the president
with the opportunity to force Congress either to reconsider its proposed law
and pass it again by a two-thirds margin in both houses, or to reject it. In
this way, Congress, and not the5 president, always decides whether or not
legislation should become law.' '
The same reasoning is applicable to the exercise of judicial review by
all levels of the federal judiciary. 152 Unqualified judicial review cannot be
justified on the basis that federal judges are more enlightened than the
members of Congress or the president.15 3 The propriety of judicial review
as a veto on federal and state action must rest squarely and solely on the
judiciary's need to defend itself against incursions by these governmental
bodies and the expectation that these bodies will occasionally make
mistakes. 54 Therefore, that veto should be limited, as it is55 for the
president, to forcing a reconsideration of the measure challenged. 1

149.
150.

Id.

ld. at 477.
Id.
The propriety of the [qualified Executive veto] does not turn upon the
supposition of superior wisdom or virtue in the Executive, but upon the
supposition that the legislature will not be infallible; that the love of
power may sometimes betray it into a disposition to encroach upon the
rights of other members of government; that a spirit of faction may
sometimes pervert its deliberations; that impressions of the moment may
sometimes hurry it into measures which itself, on maturer reflection,
would condemn.

151.
Id. at 480.
152.
See Baker, supra note 123, at 334-35; Church, supra note 118, at 1090. A
check against only the Supreme Court would be ineffectual for two reasons: (1)the Supreme
Court decides only a limited number of cases, and therefore many questions of
constitutional law affecting federal and state action are decided by the lower courts, and (2)
the Supreme Court could avoid the Congressional override by simply not reviewing lower
court decisions. See Church, supra note 118, at 1090.
153.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 29, at 57. Publius specifically rejected the
notion that the fate of American government should turn on presence of enlightened
statesmen at the helm of any branch of government. Id.
154.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton).
155.
Id. Qualified judicial review is not a new and novel idea. During the
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Allowing Congress a two-thirds override of judicial review will
provide a more amenable congressional check on the Court that will not
undermine judicial independence. 56
The Constitution secures the
independence of federal judges primarily by providing them with life
tenure. 157 Judicial independence would be unimpaired by limited judicial
review. Further, a qualification of this kind would leave the judiciary as
independent of Congress as a limited veto leaves the president. 158 The
president remains free to exercise his veto authority because the two-thirds
threshold required for a congressional override is a formidable barrier to
Congress' ability to quash an executive
veto. 159 The same would be true of
60
courts.
the
an override directed at
IV. CONCLUSION

Ring v. Arizona is only one example of the states' vulnerability to the
robust exercise of judicial review. The pervasive influence of the Supreme

Constitutional Convention, Madison proposed the creation of a Council of Revision
empowered to veto legislation before it became law. DEBATES, supra note 69, at 32, 46162. This council was to be comprised of the president and the judges of the Supreme Court.
Id. at 462. The objection of either the president or the Supreme Court would be sufficient to
veto the legislation. Id. The legislature then had the option to override the veto by a twothirds vote of each house of the legislature if either the president or the Supreme Court
objected or by a three-fourths vote of both houses of the legislature when both the president
and the court objected. Id. Although the Council of Revision was ultimately not included in
the Constitution because the Founders did not wish to mingle the executive and judicial
branches in this way, the debates on the Council are void of any objection to the legislative
authority to override the proposed judicial veto. See id. at 61-66, 79-81, 336-43, 461-65.
156.
See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 73, 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
157.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 25, at 508.
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a
limited Constitution
against legislative encroachments,
this
consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of
judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to that
independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful
performance of so arduous a duty.
Id.
158.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton).
159.
THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 48, at 480.
It is to be hoped that it will not often happen that improper views will
govern so large a proportion as two thirds of both branches of the
legislature at the same time; and this, too, in spite of the counterposing
weight of the Executive. It is at any rate far less probable that this
should be the case, than that such views should taint the resolutions and
conduct of a bare majority.
160.

See id.
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Court extends beyond criminal law and procedure. The Court has stretched
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate most,
but not all, of the Bill of Rights and their penumbral emanations against the
states. 16' If a state wishes to restrict pornography, its regulation will be
upheld against a free speech challenge under the First Amendment only if it
conforms to the precise guidelines of Miller v. California.'62 If a state
determines that school vouchers are in the best interest of their children,
and if that voucher system allows parents to choose a parochial school, then
that state must demonstrate that neither the purpose nor effect of that
system is to advance religion.163 If a state decides that neither the state
government nor its subdivisions should provide a protected status based on
sexual orientation, it will answer to the federal courts.I64 A list of all the
federal constitutional prohibitions on state activity would fill many
volumes. The point here is not to say whether the above cases, or any
cases, were decided rightly or wrongly. It could be that the prohibition of
sexually explicit material, creating school vouchers, or banning preferential
protections for sexual orientation resulted directly from faction. 65 If so,
the judiciary appropriately and effectively performed its job in each of
these cases. 166 However, if the Court's action resulted from an improper
factious motive, then the Court committed a great disservice to American
government that currently cannot be countered by the states or Congress. 167
The importance of protecting the states from undue federal judicial
control (or other federal control) extends far beyond protecting some
abstract theory of government. Democracy depends on active citizen
participation in government.168 If the federal government is to be the only

161.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-50 (1968) (providing a convenient,
though now outdated, list of the specific rights that have been incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
162. 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973).
163.
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648-49 (2002).
164.
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
165.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
166.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 25, at 506.
167.
See supra Parts II-lll.
168.
DEMOCRACY I, supra note 43, at 95; 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 102 (Phillips Bradley trans., Everyman's Library 1994) (1835) [hereinafter
DEMOCRACY II]. "As soon as a man begins to treat of public affairs in public, he begins to
perceive that he is not so independent of his fellow men as he had at first imagined, and that
in order to obtain their support he must often lend them his co-operation." Id. at 102. "I
believe that provincial institutions are useful to all nations, but nowhere do they appear to
me to be more necessary than among a democratic people. . . . How can a populace
unaccustomed to freedom in small concerns learn to use it temperately in great affairs?"
DEMOCRACY I, supra note 43, at 95.
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political entity capable of meaningfully discussing the major issues of the
day, the opportunities for active citizenship will be very rare (and will be
rarer still if real debate is limited to the federal courthouses). The federal
government
provides only 546 constitutional
officials
(435
congresspersons, 100 senators, 9 supreme court justices, one president, and
one vice-president), though that number increases by a couple hundred
when the total number of federal district and appellate court judges are
included. 69 In a nation of more than 288 million people, that can hardly be
said to constitute a government of the people. 70 The benefit of having
states, counties, municipalities, and other political subdivisions is that they
multiply dramatically the opportunities for citizens to participate in the
administration of public affairs. '7 ' However, the benefit of these divisions
is greatly diminished if the participants are denied the ability to actually
decide the issues confronting their communities. 172
The two constitutional amendments advocated above are ultimately
offered as a means to facilitate and protect active citizen participation in
American government. This is their sole aim. Unless the states are given a
means to protect themselves against federal encroachment, the realm in
which they can operate free from federal control will continue to diminish,
and with it the opportunity for Americans to govern themselves in fact as
well as in theory.
KORY A. ATKINSON

169.
U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. I (executive power vested in one president and
provision made for one vice-president); see 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (2000) (apportionment of
House of Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. I (Senate composed of two senators
from each state); 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (establishing nine supreme court justices); 28 U.S.C.
§ 44 (2000) (establishing number of circuit judges for all circuit courts of appeals); 28
U.S.C. § 133 (2000) (establishing number of district judges for all district courts).
170.
Peter Gorner, U.S. Releases its Smallpox Outbreak Plan; Rapid Vaccination
Needed, C.D.C. Says, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24, 2002, § I, at 7 ("The Bureau of the Census
estimates the U.S. population at more than 288 million").
171.
DEMOCRACY I1, supra note 168, at 103. "[The American legislators] thought
that it would be well to infuse political life into each portion of the territory in order to
multiply to an infinite extent opportunities of acting in concert for all the members of the
community and to make them constantly feel their mutual dependence." Id.
172.
DEMOCRACY I, supra note 43, at 90-91. "[The human will] must be free in its
gait and responsible for its acts, or (such is the constitution of man) the citizen had rather
remain a passive spectator than a dependent actor in schemes with which he is
unacquainted." Id.

